This study explores how the 2009 political crisis in Madagascar influenced local access to, and claims over, marine resources within marine protected areas. It focuses specifically on how different conservation actors constructed and maintained authority over each protected area. Surveys conducted in 2010 show how community-managed protected areas had a lower incidence of resource use rule infractions during the crisis than state-managed areas. Drawing from in-depth qualitative research conducted from 2009 to 2015, I argue that this occurred due to the discursive framing of 'community authority' over protected areas as well as the social relationships with, and material benefits communities received from, international conservation organisations working in the communitymanaged areas. In contrast, I argue that state-managed marine protected area rules were transgressed more due to the symbolic and physical ousting of state authority underpinning a fear-based relationship between the state managers and community members. Ultimately, this work points to the importance of understanding how different conservation actors construct and maintain authority over marine resources.
INTRODUCTION
When people heard that Ravalomanana was ousted, it meant that there weren't any of his environmental workers. So, people broke into the no-take zone. They brought fishing spears. Laws were meaningless, so they said let's go. 1 -Fisher; northeastern Madagascar; June 8, 2009 In early 2009, Madagascar was in a state of political upheaval. The capital city, Antananarivo, was the focal point of the unrest; the city mayor Andry Nirina Rajoelina called for the Malagasy people to rise up and demand that the incumbent president, Marc Ravalomanana, step down. In March of 2009, Ravalomanana 'handed over' power to the military, who then installed opposition rival Rajoelina as the self-titled head of the transitional government. Approximately one hundred people died in the protests, although some cite much larger numbers (Ploch 2011) . The USA and the European Union denounced Rajoelina's rise to power and labelled it a 'coup d'état'. The South African Development Community as well as other bilateral and multilateral organisations condemned Rajoelina's undemocratic rise to power. As a result, aid organisations withdrew millions of dollars from Madagascar, a large proportion of which were slated for environmental protection. Although most protests and deaths during the crisis occurred from January 2009 to November 2009, the regime of the transitional government officially ended in 2014, with the election of Hery Rajaonarimampianina.
Given Madagascar's unique flora and fauna as well as the billions of dollars that have been invested in conservation across the island before the political crisis (Corson 2016) , the international conservation community was deeply concerned about the way in which the political upheaval would increase pressure on Madagascar's biodiversity. In the first year of the political crisis, an estimated 52,000 tonnes of rosewood and ebony were illegally exported from the northeastern rainforests of Madagascar, of which approximately a third was taken from inside state-protected areas (Randriamalala and Liu 2010; Zhu 2017) . A spike in the illegal trade of endangered exotic species (Global Witness 2009) and exports of natural resources during the political turmoil were also reported (ICG 2010) . Several high-profile reports documenting the plunder of natural resources during the 2009 crisis hit international news (Revkin 2009; Draper 2010; Schwitzer et al. 2014) . As a result of political instability since the 1970s, the island's political economy has been defined by boom and bust cycles in natural resource use (Razafindrakoto, Roubaud, and Wachsberger 2017; Zhu 2017; Anonymous 2018) .
Anxiety about the political crisis within the conservation community, both domestic and international, focused on the illegal extraction of resources from protected areas-zones deemed part of a 'global heritage' necessitating 'global responsibility' for their protection (Corson 2016) . In early 2012, despite the Madagascar government being deemed 'illegitimate by a large number of countries, the World Bank agreed to 'exceptional additional financing' in order to 'cover the costs of avoiding further environmental deterioration as a result of the political situation' (Toure and Rabemananoro 2012) . Although much of the anxiety was focused on terrestrial areas, there was also concern about marine protected areas (MPAs) due to declining fisheries production, marine habitat destruction, and the impact of global climate change on marine ecosystems (Freudenberger 2010; MEF 2010; Harris 2011; Le Manach et al. 2012) .
This paper addresses the fate of MPAs following the country's political upheaval. This research specifically illuminates the contested nature of marine enclosures via fishers' relationships with different MPA governance strategies. The 2009 political crisis in Madagascar provides a unique understanding of how authority over marine enclosures was established and maintained across different governance strategies (state managed, co-managed, and community managed). This research highlights the mutually constitutive nature of authority and property, showing how a resource governing body's claims to natural resources are contingent on the legitimacy of the claims as perceived by resource users. In particular, it shows how perceptions of the legitimacy of the Malagasy government and international conservation organisations as authorities over MPAs during the political crisis influenced fishers' perceptions of their rights to access marine resources.
ROLE OF MARINE PROTECTED AREAS
Marine protected areas are seen by scientists and conservation practitioners as a way to simultaneously address decline in fisheries, protect unique or endangered marine species, and buffer against climate change (Green et al. 2014) . Reports in the last few decades show declining catch across multiple fisheries in Madagascar (Le Manach et al. 2012) . Although laws exist that ban certain types of fishing gear, restrict certain fisheries seasonally, and prohibit extraction of endangered marine organisms, the seeming ineffectiveness of these management strategies, along with pressure from the international policy arena to put marine and coastal environments under protection, has resulted in conservation organisations collectively turning towards expanding MPAs in Madagascar (SAPM 2009; Gray 2010; Harris 2011; Rocliffe et al. 2014; Oliver et al. 2015) . Shortly after the 2003 World Parks Congress, where the former president of Madagascar pledged to dramatically increase the total area under protection, including one million marine hectares (SAPM 2009) in Madagascar, the number of MPAs exponentially increased as both governmental and non-governmental organisations started funding and establishing MPAs in every region of the island. The dramatic expansion of MPAs in Madagascar in the past decade echoes the proliferation of marine enclosures worldwide (IUCN and UNEP-WCMC 2019) .
Although the expansion of MPAs has occurred and continues to occur at a historical moment when decentralised governance is the dominant management paradigm (Levine 2007; Ferse et al. 2010; Rocliffe et al. 2014) , scholars have called into question the ability of conservation projects to truly enfranchise local populations. Studies show that decentralised marine conservation strategies often struggle to fundamentally shift the terms on which power is negotiated among the state, non-governmental organisations, and resource users (Christie 2004; Levine 2007; Voyer, Gladstone, and Goodall 2014; Vaughan and Caldwell 2015) . In addition, scholars have shown that class, race, age, and gender disparities within a given coastal community also influence who is able to benefit from, and who is most negatively impacted by, the existence of MPAs (Walker and Robinson 2009; Baker-Médard 2017; Kamat 2018) .
Although MPAs should theoretically benefit local fishers through the spillover of marine organisms from inside the protected areas to the fishing zones outside the protected areas, depending on the ecological and social conditions, MPAs may not enhance fisheries production and in some cases may actually decrease fish diversity and biomass (Edgar et al. 2014 ). Furthermore, even if fisheries are stabilised by the establishment of MPAs, these changes are not necessarily obvious to individual fishers or considered linked to the MPA. Many of the interviewed fishers ascribed their catch to destiny, skill, and the will of their ancestors rather than to ecological enrichment from an MPA. This indicates the importance of conservation organisations creating other mediums through which to confer benefits to fishing communities. Research on the social outcomes of MPAs shows substantial negative economic, political, and cultural impacts of MPAs on adjacent fishing communities (Walley 2004; Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; Bennett and Dearden 2014; Voyer, Gladstone, and Goodall 2014; Kamat 2018) . In areas where benefits do accrue to local communities, benefits are often distributed unevenly, fomenting resentment within coastal communities and between communities and MPA managers (Levine 2007; Kamat 2018) .
Scholars have shown that the enclosure of marine spaces in the name of conservation benefits mostly conservation organisations-from donor financing for the continuation and expansion of their work as well as tour operators-from tourism revenue (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; Kamat 2018; Raycraft 2019) . The process of enclosure and dispossession in the marine realm-deemed blue-green (ocean) grabbing-often occurs in near-shore coastal regions; hence, it disproportionately impacts small-scale fishers while little is done to address large-scale industrial fishing efforts that heavily impact marine environments globally (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; Bennett, Govan, and Satterfield 2015; Wolff 2015) . The dispossession of fishing grounds within MPAs, however, has not been absolute or uncontested. This highlights the importance of understanding property and natural resource access dynamics in each fishing site.
THEORY OF PROPERTY AND ACCESS
Understanding processes of marine enclosure and fishers' responses to the enclosure of fishing grounds necessitates understanding property and access. MPAs are particularly interesting property regimes produced not only by state laws but also by international regulations as well as local norms and rules. Property is broadly defined as the right (or bundle of rights) to benefit from things (Demsetz 1967; MacPherson 1978) . Resource use rights are property claims sanctioned by an authorising institution; however, as Lund (2002) argues, the security of one's property rights is contingent on the power of the politico-legal institution sanctioning the right. As a corollary, the power of a given politico-legal institution to uphold its claims is contingent on the institution's ability to be recognised as an authority by those it aims to govern (Lund 2002) . In other words, the authority of a given resource governing institution is predicated on the ability of the institution to 'gain and sustain' legitimacy in the eyes of the resource users (Lund 2002; Verdery 2003; Sikor and Lund 2009 ). This understanding of legitimacy is born from the recognition that legitimacy is a process, something that must be actively established and maintained (Moore 1988; Fortmann 1995; Sikor and Lund 2009; Lund and Boone 2013) . Often, the legitimacy of a property claim is predicated on the resource governing institution's ability to persuade or subordinate resource users with reference to 'facts' founded in science as well as precedence found in law or policy, economic efficiency, and/or socio-cultural mores that conjure up notions of what is 'right' or 'moral' (Moore 1988; Fortmann 1990; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Sikor and Lund 2009; Corson 2011b) . Within these bids for legitimacy, institutionalised or structural subordination may be accompanied by violence and hegemonic aspirations, core dynamics found in many property relations (Peluso and Watts 2001; Blomley 2003) , or may be born from adherence to social mores or beliefs about duty and obligation (von Benda-Beckmann, von Benda-Beckmann, and Wiber 2006) . The suite of discursive framings and material practices associated with efforts to gain and maintain authority are a core focus of this study.
The contingent nature of legitimised authority underpinning property relations points to a wider set of mechanisms through which fishers gain and maintain access to marine resources. While property is broadly defined as the right to benefit from things, Ribot and Peluso (2003) define access as 'the ability to benefit from things' (153; emphasis added). In Ribot and Peluso's (2003) framework, access is comprised of the full range of social relationships that constrain or enable people to benefit from resources, including but not limited to institutionally legitimated rights (e.g., property). Ribot and Peluso (2003) argue that a broad suite of 'social-relational mechanisms' (e.g., use of knowledge, authority, technology, markets, capital, or labour) directly influence an individual's or community's ability to access natural resources-even without a shift in formal property rights. These mechanisms-defined as the 'means, processes, and relations by which actors are enabled to gain, control, and maintain access to resources' (Ribot and Peluso 2003: 8 )-highlight the porous nature of resource rights, illustrating the broader suite of tools and processes through which resource users contest and resist claims to resources. Similarly, as Lund (2008) argues, 'laws, regulations, and policies do not determine access and use of resources as such but erect a structure of opportunities for negotiation of these rights' (155). These understandings of resource access and rights draws on a Foucauldian notion of power, which emphasises the importance of one's social and political position in gaining and maintaining access to resources (Foucault 1978) . The particular social positions and political configurations in which access and rights exist inevitably change over space and time, influenced both by shifts in the broader political economy and in governance structures (e.g., decentralisation, colonisation, political upheaval, etc.; Sikor and Lund 2009 ).
This research shows how conservation organisations' (either governmental or non-governmental) property claims over MPAs are predicated on the authority the sanctioning institutions are able to establish with local fishing communities. While the Malagasy government prior to the political crisis was not a monolithic authoritative entity, what authority existed-metaphorical or enacted-was severely jeopardised with the onset of the 2009 political crisis. In protected areas where the government (fanjakana) was the perceived authority, the political crisis meant that the government's control over the area was weakened. The tetezamita 2 (transitional government led by Rajoelina) was deemed a 'weak' government, an 'outlaw state', and 'unofficial' 3 by most people in the areas included in this study.
In contrast to the Malagasy government, international NGOs were shielded from the delegitimising force of the political crisis. While NGOs derived some of their authority through their interaction with governmental institutions, they also functioned independent of the state, leaning on their role as outside 'advisors' and 'technicians' in both governmentmanaged and community-managed conservation projects (Haley and Clayton 2003; Corson 2011a; Baker-Médard 2017) . Additionally, because NGOs exist in the liminal space between the state and the society as well as between the public and the private (Duffy 2005b; Lund 2006) , conservation organisations were able to continue their work during the political crisis. Drawing on an international network of scientists and financial backers, most environmental NGOs were able to maintain and, in some cases, increase funding for their conservation projects (Baker-Médard Forthcoming).
METHODS
This research draws on both qualitative and quantitative data collected during 18 months of fieldwork (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) in northeastern and southwestern Madagascar, including 14 oral histories and 82 semi-structured interviews using snowball sampling with fishers, regional and national level government officials, and non-governmental conservation organisation personnel. This research also draws from over 9 months of participant observation in primarily three fishing villages-Kobalava, Hoalankara, and Komajivabe. I refer to these villages by pseudonyms in order to protect the identities of my informants.
In addition, this research draws on randomised survey data (n=889) stratified by gender (431 men, 458 women) across 19 villages corresponding to eight marine conservation projects in northeastern and southwestern Madagascar. Surveys were conducted in early 2011 with the help of a team of eight Malagasy researchers. Surveys focused on harvest practices; perceptions of, and participation in, management; and the impact of the political crisis on level of infractions in each village. Four conservation projects were community managed, two were co-managed, and two were state managed. The three ethnographic case studies detailed in this study were also surveyed and correspond to three of the eight marine conservation projects.
Differences in marine resource use rule infractions across management categories ( Figure 1 ) were determined using a Tukey HSD pairwise comparison. The correlation between the level of NGO presence and the reported increase in marine resource use rule infractions ( Figure 2 ) was determined by ANOVA regression. The level of NGO presence (evaluated on a continuum from 1 to 10) across the 19 villages was quantified based on interviews with village presidents; interviews with, or actual timetables from, field-based NGO agents; and fishing village surveys.
Surveys were randomised by estimating the number of houses from Google Earth maps or recent village census data, assigning a number to each house, and then generating a random number table online at stattrek.com (30 for villages >200 houses, 15 for villages <200 houses) to randomly select houses. Each survey team (stratified by gender, with separate number tables) would survey the first willing female or male respondent over the age of 18 in each selected house.
In addition to these field-based methods, I draw on literature by governmental and non-governmental conservation and development organisations working in one or several of the conservation intervention zones.
RESULTS
By examining marine conservation projects representing a mixture of governance regimes, this research examines how notions of resource management legitimacy and authority influenced fishers' access to marine resources during the political crisis. Across all management types, most survey respondents reported an increase in marine resource use rule infractions (descriptive statistics in Table 1 ). This was true for three of the four types of infractions-fishing in a no-take zone, harvesting restricted species (e.g., sea turtles), and using restricted gear (e.g., diving with oxygen for sea cucumbers or using a beach seine to fish). For the fourth type of infraction-fishing out of season (e.g., fishing lobster during closed season)-most respondents reported that there was no significant change in the level of infractions during the political crisis.
When deaggregating these results according to management type, however, differences emerge. Approximately 80% of
Figure 1 Proportion of people reporting an increase in marine resource use rule infractions due to the political crisis across (community, co-management, and state) management categories

Figure 2 Correlation between level of NGO presence and proportion of respondents reporting an increase in marine resource use rule infractions due to the political crisis
people in villages with co-management and state management (no significant difference between the two, p=0.72) reported an increase in resource use rule infractions (Figure 1 ). However, villages with co-management and state management differed significantly in their reported level of resource use rule infractions from villages with community management (p<0.01 for both pairwise comparisons). Just over 20% of people in villages with community management reported an increase in resource use rule infractions. Although with co-management projects, the government ostensibly manages the MPA in collaboration with the local community, in practice many fishers see the government as the primary, if not only, manager of the MPA. This will be explored in more detail in the Kobalava case study. While the survey results are important indicators of the processes at work during the political crisis across different MPA management types, it is necessary to dig below the surface to understand the nature of these differences. Drawing on ethnographic research, including participant observation, I look at the history of three marine conservation projects that correspond to each of the management types to trace how marine resource management authority was established and how this authority shifted during political upheaval.
Case study: Hoalankara: "Vaky Magro ANGAP"
Hoalankara is a village on the coast of a coral-laden peninsula in northeastern Madagascar. This peninsula is known for choppy seas, big swells, and equally big fish. Hoalankara was one of four villages sharing the coral-laden peninsula that became an MPA in the late 1990s. The sheltered area of the ocean behind the reef was divided into strict no-take zones and regulated fishing zones. A guard station staffed with 1-2 park guards was located just outside the village of Hoalankara. The guards surveyed the no-take zones with binoculars from the shore and patrolled the area in kayaks.
An international environmental organisation helped establish the MPA; however, approximately three years after its inception, it transferred the management of the MPA to Madagascar National Parks (MNP, then called ANGAP 4 ). Although park guards employed by MNP were hired to monitor and enforce MPA rules, documents for park management use phrases like 'integrate local knowledge into MPA planning' and 'involve local stakeholders in park management.' MNP historically relied entirely on the 'fences and fines' fortress style of conservation; however, in the 1990s, with the rise of decentralised conservation strategies, MNP attempted to involve local communities in resource management. Research documenting this transition shows that its attempts to enfranchise local communities have been largely unsuccessful (Henkels 1999; Kull 2004; Pollini and Lassoie 2011; Corson 2016) .
Shortly after the 2009 political crisis began, fishers from Hoalankara and two adjacent villages staged a protest in the MPA. At the peak of the protest, for several weeks, fishers gathered together and entered the no-take zones of the MPA to extract anything edible or marketable. Some of the more lucrative marine products extracted during these protests were sea cucumbers, decorative shells, octopuses, and large fish. Numerous interviewees from Hoalankara maintained that hundreds of fishers entered the no-take zone of the MPA every day of these peak protest weeks.
The fishers who participated in the protest explained that they were generally not against Ravalomanana, but specifically were opposed to his environmental policy. Ravalomanana was often cited as the overseer of governmental efforts to maintain protection of Hoalankara's no-take zone. More generally, many fishers saw the protest staged in Hoalankara as a way to partake in the protest events occurring in major cities, where one of the biggest pieces of news was the shooting and deaths of protesters in the capital as well as the looting and burning of shops and storage facilities. One of the main storage facilities targetted was Ravalomanana's bulk food company called MAGRO. Certain MPA protesters from Hoalankara drew such clear parallels of their actions to the actions of the protesters in the cities that they referred to the MPA protest as 'vaky MAGRO ANGAP', meaning 'the National Park's storage facility has broken open.'
Local fishers framing the MPA no-take zone as a 'governmental storage facility' underscores an important property relation in Hoalankara. Instead of the expected vacuum of authority that one might expect with a 'tragedy of the commons' open-access scenario (Hardin 1968), marine resources were conceived of as state property and actions were taken against the state. The seizure of marine organisms was conceptualised in political terms in relation to the protests happening in the capital city. While the rights of these fishers had not changed, their mechanism of access to marine resources was based on their common identity as fishers and on a desire to collectively resist the government's claims to marine resources in the area.
When I talked to people in Hoalankara about the inception of the marine conservation project, most said that initially local interest in the project was high. Nearly everybody thought the [MPA] would be a good thing", the current village president of Hoalankara asserted in an interview (pers. comm. July 18, 2009). However, over the years, the relationship between MNP and the people of Hoalankara became increasingly contentious. Most fishers here have been punished by [MNP]", exclaimed one woman. Her husband and three sons are fishers and they all had been fined at some point in the past 5 years. She then elaborated, "most people hate MNP" (pers. comm. November 20, 2010) . When I asked people in Hoalankara if they were involved in managing the MPA, most confirmed they were not. In one case, a man said his relationship with MNP was akin to the relationship between "chili peppers and an eye 5 " (pers. comm. November 4, 2010). This souring relationship was also echoed in interviews with MNP personnel. According to the former director of marine conservation for MNP, infractions of marine resource use rules steadily increased approximately two years after the MPA's inauguration (pers. comm. July 14, 2009). When I asked one focus group of fishers why people started infractions of marine resource use rules, one man replied "people were fed up of waiting for benefits [from the MPA and project] to arrive 6 " (November 22, 2010) . As people's respect for the project dwindled, MNP's authority over the protected area increasingly relied on backing from state institutions such as the police, military, and court system. Respect for the protected area was maintained through fear and subordination. Prior to the 2009 political crisis, fishers from Hoalankara who transgressed marine resource use rules were fined, imprisoned, or forced to do labour for the state (e.g., repair roads) if unable to pay the fine. Although fishers were fearful of punishment prior to the 2009 collective protest, some still found subtle ways to resist MNP's authority (Scott 1985) such as by fishing inside the no-take zone at night or setting nets in the water outside the no-take zone during the day to give an impression of net fishing but illegally diving for sea cucumbers inside the notake zone. However, after the 2009 collective protest, illegal activities from individual fishers became more commonplace, even during the day. The events of 2009 marked the start of a recalibrated set of property relations, one where the legitimacy of MNP's authority over the MPA was questioned and thus openly flouted.
Highlighting this transitional moment in property relations and access in Hoalankara, one sea cucumber diver explained "before they [MNP] counted everything (mandrefirefy 7 ) and enforced rules, but now they are weak". He further clarified, "MNP agents are still paid, but the rest of the government isn't functioning so they [MNP] are alone (irery)" (pers. comm. November 16, 2010). Another fisher from Hoalankara echoed a similar sentiment "people used to be scared of the government… but now the crisis has come and things are different here. We all protested the no-take zone, went in, and took what we wanted. They didn't catch us. The government is too weak now" (pers. comm. July 17, 2009).
Though funding for conservation continued in Hoalankara, authority over the protected area did not come from the mere presence of protected area guards. For Hoalankara, power came from the ability to enforce claims-writing citations, fining, and sending people to court. I write citations", one agent based part-time in Hoalankara explained, "but the police must follow through, they are not doing their job in this crisis", (pers. comm. November 19, 2010). Another park guard explained that he was trying to take notes about who transgressed MPA rules and once the police and court systems "worked again" he would report them (pers. comm. November 18, 2010). The case of Hoalankara underscores how MNP's authority over marine resources-or power to enforce protected area rules-was predicated on both the threat and the execution of punishment by government-supported institutions.
Case study: Kobalava: "Rosewood Problem of the Sea"
Approximately 100 km to the south of Hoalankara is the village of Kobalava. Large waves churn along the shoreline, leaving few launching points for boats to go out to sea. Once at sea, most fishers focus their efforts a few kilometres offshore, around a cluster of three coral-laden islands. In the late 1980s, a conservation project funded by a large international conservation organisation arrived in Kobalava. The project personnel presented to the Kobalava villagers an idea of establishing a co-managed marine park. This project was seen as an enlightened alternative to top-down conservation. It was also seen as ahead of its time in terms of its attention to terrestrial and marine conservation. The co-management arrangement was supposed to be a 50-50 arrangement between the Malagasy government and the people living in four villages (Kobalava being the largest). The international conservation organisation, although critical of the MPA's inception, never planned to stay. Through village associations and committees, Kobalava villagers were supposed to be involved with all aspects of marine resource management including decision making, monitoring, and enforcement (Kobalava project report, fisher focus group Kobalava; October 25, 2010).
However, co-management never came to fruition. According to a report written for the government by a consulting agency in the late 1990s, "the local management sector of park operations has long been tenuous and in the shadows of the technical operations of other park sectors". The authors of this report then argue that "increased attention to local participation is essential" and that "the sustainability of the project depends on the dynamic input of local associations". Despite this call for change, according to an internal government report written in the late 2000s, local involvement in marine resource management was reduced to three representatives from three different villages adjacent to the MPA. Corroborating the progressive decrease in community involvement in MPA management, both park agents and key informants from Kobalava said that although the initial setup of the project facilitated some community involvement, by early 2000, Kobalava's fishing association and local management committee was functionally extinct. Most people who were once members of this association ranted about how they were duped by the governmental and non-governmental officials into thinking they were going to have some control over project. 'Co-management' meetings in Kobalava were almost entirely unattended only a decade after the establishment of the MPA because, as the village president exclaimed, "we didn't want to hear lies anymore" (pers. comm. October 28, 2010). Community involvement in Kobalava's marine conservation project turned from attempting to engage the entire community to hiring one middle-aged man to 'represent' the village. Although he used to be a respected leader in the village, his involvement with the MPA provoked the rest of the community to slowly turn against him. He said he had to move his family to the outskirts of the village. During an interview, he lamented that someone from the village even poisoned his dog to punish him for his alliance with MNP (pers. comm. October 25, 2010) .
When I first started asking people in Kobalava about the political crisis, many complained that the crisis had decreased the price of cloves and vanilla and that fewer buyers were making the trek to collect marine products (fish and octopuses). Young men from Kobalava, however, had a different story. Many explained that they were now making more money than ever. Wealthy boat-owners from port cities several hundred kilometres away, some of whom worked directly for marine exporters, hired local men to dive for sea cucumbers or collect other lucrative products such as shark fins, seahorses, and the bladders of elongated fish (salavatraka). As Kobalava's marine park director explained, the crisis led to a spike in illegal marine resource extraction from the MPA. He said that the illegal harvest of marine products paralleled that of the illegal rosewood extraction in terrestrial protected areas, calling it 'the rosewood problem of the sea ' (pers. comm. November 6, 2010) .
Fishers interviewed in Kobalava admitted to taking fish, octopuses, sea cucumbers, and bivalves inside the MPA. The fishers of Kobalava, like those of Hoalankara, heard about the political crisis and thought that it would "loosen 8 " MNP's control over the MPA. However, instead of staging a protest in, or collectively rushing to, the no-take zone of the MPA, fishers obtained access to marine resources by becoming 'food friends' (kamarady ro) with park guards-a patron-client relationship where marine products were exchanged for access to the notake zone of the MPA. Thus, despite no formal shifts in fishers' property rights to marine resources, fishers' relationships with the recognised authority (MNP-hired guards) granted them contingent access to marine resources inside the MPA. One park guard verified the kamarady ro relationship in an interview, emphasising that provisions were limited on the island and that it was "nice to get fresh fish from friends". He elaborated, "sometimes I take a nap during the day or I sleep through the night", inferring that he looked the other way when certain kamarady ro were fishing in the no-take zone. He then added that "it's hard to enforce the rules anyway these days" (pers. comm. October 20, 2010) .
Similar to the case of Hoalankara, since the start of the political crisis, MNP reported difficulty prosecuting villagers for park infractions. As one guard explained:
We [MNP] can only denounce people; we have never had the right to arrest. We are able to only go to the police and fill a report, but then it is sent to the courts and they decide and give the verdict. People are not scared to disobey the law because the authorities are not taking responsibility for the problem. If someone takes rosewood, they're not punished. If someone takes sea cucumbers, they're not punished. There is no point; all levels of authority are too corrupt now. There has always been corruption, but not this level of corruption. Park guard; northeastern Madagascar; October 22, 2010 By 2009, the enforcement of marine resource use rules in Kobalava had long been out of the hands of local people, reliant entirely on governmental institutions such as the courts and police. With the onset of the political crisis and the weakening of governmental authority backing Kobalava's MPA, park guards felt free to engage in patronage relationships, affording fishers greater access to resources within the MPA. The kamarady ro system that emerged between park guards and fishers maintained the general configuration of park management authority. The guards still monitored the park and fishers still recognised MNP authority because they continued to confer part of their catch to the park guards.
Case study: Komajivabe: "We Are Not the Government"
Approximately 50 km to the north of Kobalava is Komajivabe. A fringing reef located a kilometre offshore protects a seafloor mosaic of sea grass, sand, and blue and green algae. South of town, the ocean is shallow enough to wade during low tide all the way out to the reef's edge. Komajivabe was part of a community-conservation project. According to interviews, the rules of the MPA were generally upheld in Komajivabe during the political crisis.
When news of the political crisis came to Komajivabe, a new temporary no-take zone was slated to close for four months. The NGO said that it went ahead as planned and closed the notake zone despite the onset of the political crisis. When I asked fishers and other community members about the impact of the political crisis on their lives, most talked about the increased price of food. When I oriented the conversation towards the relationship between the political crisis and the MPAs, my curiosity was met with puzzled looks. As one fisher explained, "the crisis didn't really have many consequences here for the MPA" (pers. comm. November 2, 2010). According to members of the local management committee as well as other non-committee villagers, there was no noticeable increase in the level of infractions correlated with the political crisis. One management committee member explained:
The crisis has not had a big effect here. The prices of some fish dropped, so some people suffered. But people still fished. I still fished to make a living. The effect of the crisis on the protected area? None. We inaugurated a new protected area at the same time the protests [in the capital city] happened. The [NGO] paid for the party. Nobody protested our park here. We are not the government.
Fisher; northeastern Madagascar; November 4, 2010
In the mid-2000s, an international NGO initiated the establishment of six community-based conservation projects in the region. Adjacent to each village, a small (0.5-2.0 sq. km) temporary no-take MPA was put in place in addition to a slightly larger permanent no-take MPA further (1-2 km) offshore. Each temporary MPA closed for 3-4 months and then opened for 3-4 months before it closed again. Several times a month, the NGO visited Komajivabe and the five other villages in the region. The marine conservation project was initially met with some scepticism and resistance from Komajivabe fishers. MNP had unsuccessfully tried establishing a small no-take zone in the area three years earlier, which according to one NGO worker, created resentment towards marine conservation efforts in the area (pers. comm. November 5, 2010) . Therefore, when the international NGO first visited the area, representatives from the organisation focused on distancing their marine conservation efforts from past efforts (regional director of marine conservation pers. comm. November 18, 2010).
Early on, the NGO established a local marine management committee with over 20 members. The NGO working with the villagers of Komajivabe provided committee members with laminated badges with their name, photo, and title 'andrimasopokonolo' (community police/guard) written across the bottom. 9 Andrimasopokonolo were tasked with surveying the MPAs as they go about their daily activities such as fishing, repairing nets or boats on shore, or traveling to adjacent villages.
An NGO worker explained that the badges were an important part of the NGO's strategy to facilitate community participation. He explained that "transferring management responsibility to the community" would only happen if the local committee and andrimasopokonolo were "respected by people", stressing the importance of gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the broader community. Although the NGO determined the key strategies Komajivabe used to manage their marine resources (e.g., implement two kinds of MPAs, restrict certain fishing gear), these badges were a visual attestation of shared authority over the MPA. Although the andrimasopokonolo's enforcement mechanisms were ultimately backed by government institutions such as the district police and regional court system, this was not disclosed in community meetings. Also, there had not been infractions egregious enough (e.g., diving for sea cucumbers with oxygen tanks) to merit going beyond local dispute resolution mechanisms.
Despite local participation in MPA management, many villagers expressed that they were still withholding judgment to see if the project will continue to benefit the village. NGO workers seemed aware of this and thus emphasised the ability of the MPA to make "lots of fish" and "make fish bigger" in community meetings. Instead of being called a "noyeau dure" ("core" or no-take zone in French) as was the case in Hoalankara, the Komajivabe MPAs were called fitarimon-doko "fish nurseries". This language, carefully curated by the NGO, reflects a subtle yet important branding strategy aimed at convincing local fishers of the security of their access to fish inside the notake zone via the process of "spillover" (e.g., when fish leave the no-take zone and are harvested). Similarly, despite the presence of a permanent no-take MPA in deeper waters, NGO workers focused on the temporary no-take zone, one that opened after few months. One NGO worker said that local fishers still need to be convinced of the utility of permanent no-take MPAs, so by focusing on the temporary no-take zone "people can see that the MPA works" (pers. comm. September 21, 2010) . He went on to explain that opening day for the temporary no-take zone provides tangible evidence to locals that will eventually help the community accept the permanent no-take zone.
Although a few interviewees in Komajivabe cited the opening day of the temporary MPA as the primary reason they like the marine conservation project, most cited other reasons such as free t-shirts, training received (e.g., boat making and fish preservation techniques in workshops by the NGO), film screenings, food, and a whole range of small favours that "friends do for friends". NGO workers confirmed that they would find small ways to repay individuals who helped with project duties such as announcing committee meetings, erecting a billboard in town describing marine resource use rules, or fixing large sticks to the reef to mark the no-take zone. Despite the informal context of most of these exchanges, they were the foundation upon which NGOs maintained their legitimacy as resource managers and garnered community participation.
The conservation NGO working in Komajivabe not only continued its work in Komajivabe but also expanded its operations and efforts to new regions of the island in 2009 and 2010. Komajivabe's village president was flown from northeastern Madagascar to southwestern Madagascar (his first time on a plane) for a "community-based conservation exchange" soon after the onset of the political crisis. After his return, he marvelled at the money available to the NGO despite the crisis. The abundance of funding that was available to the NGO, specifically from foundations, during the political crisis was confirmed by the NGO's fundraising manager-"foundations do not have any business with the political crisis; it's their own private decision to allocate some money, so [we] were really fortunate to have secured this funding" (per. comm. July 20, 2011).
The ethnographic findings from Komajivabe illustrate several key points. First, the relative stability of funding for the NGO helped the organisation maintain their presence in Komajivabe to carry out day-to-day MPA management activities. The importance of the frequent presence of NGO workers in Komajivabe is confirmed by survey data; the stronger the reported presence of NGOs, the lower the reported increase in marine resource use rule infractions during the political crisis ( Figure 2) . Second, the ongoing presence and financial security of the NGO in Komajivabe enabled the organisation to maintain key patronage relationships with the local fishing community. These relationships provided the foundation upon which the NGO was able to not only establish their legitimacy as resource managers but also maintain community participation in the project.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
These case studies show the importance of the discursive and material practices associated with different MPA management strategies in shaping fishers' access and property claims to marine resources during the 2009 political crisis. In the two areas where the government was the perceived manager of the MPA, once the fear of punishment was partially lifted with the onset of the political crisis, marine resource users found ways (collectively for Hoalankara, individually for Kobalava) to transgress marine resource use rules. Despite 'exceptional additional financing' from the World Bank that went to help government-supported protected area infrastructure and personnel, the broader politico-legal system (police, court system, etc.) in which these protected areas were situated was not functioning to help enforce resource use rules in these areas.
While the legitimacy of the government as a management authority was gained through the subordination of fishers with the threat of fines or imprisonment, maintaining this legitimacy was contingent on the government's ability to carry out these threats. In the absence of the government's ability to carry out the threats, resource use rules were broken at a higher rate than before the crisis. In Hoalankara, it was precisely because MNP legitimacy was born from the threat of punishment from the state, that the marine resources were conceived of as state property instead of as the fishing community's property. Thus, when fishers decided to raid the MPA in Hoalankara, they did so with the understanding that they were taking from the state (Ravalomanana's MAGRO), not from themselves or future generations. Despite efforts to 'integrate' or 'involve' the community in both the state-managed and co-managed areas, the findings presented here indicate a failure to share management authority with the fishing communities adjacent the MPAs. This finding aligns with a those of a multitude of other studies on MPAs that show the critical importance of recognising the marine property rights of fishing communities and sharing management authority over marine resources (Pollnac, Crawford, and Gorospe 2001; Ferse et al. 2010; Hind, Hiponia, and Gray 2010; Green et al. 2011; Hamilton, Potuku, and Montambault 2011; Bennett and Dearden 2014; Turnbull et al. 2018) .
While both international NGOs and the Malagasy government were critical of the establishment of all the MPAs in this study, the discursive importance and material presence of these institutions varied widely across sites. Findings from Komajivabe show that the higher NGO presence in the community-managed area was accompanied by patronage relationships that benefited local people. While governmental institutions such as the police and court system backed all MPAs, in the case of Komajivabe, the role of the government was deemphasised (or entirely omitted) in community meetings regarding the MPA. Additionally, although patronage relationships also played an important role in the case of Kobalava (fishers gained access to marine resources via being 'food friends' with park guards), these relationships were not embedded in the broader pursuit of community involvement or transfer of resource management authority. Instead, the secrecy and illegality of the patronage relationships in Kobalava upheld the broader governance structure based on fear of fines and imprisonment.
Although one might be tempted to look at some of the survey data ( Figure 1 ) and draw the conclusion that community-based conservation is a better strategy to weather a political crisis, this ignores the critical importance of the ongoing presence of international environmental NGOs in the 'communitymanaged' areas. 10 The findings from Komajivabe illustrate that beyond an ongoing presence, the patronage relationships and the message of 'serving local needs' and 'empowering local managers' aided the NGOs in gaining and maintaining their legitimacy as resource managers. The NGO's careful framing of temporary MPAs as "fish nurseries" and the creation of a visual testimony of villager participation (andrimasopokonolo badges) allowed it to discursively shift authority to the community while retaining much of their control over the orientation and methods used in conserving marine resources. Furthermore, the NGO in Komajivabe was able to retain its legitimacy as a resource management authority by detaching its work from the Malagasy government, whose authority was jeopardised during the 2009 crisis.
Similarly, one might be tempted to draw the conclusion from the survey findings ( Figure 2) that NGOs are better positioned to implement and manage conservation projects rather than other institutions. Research examining NGO control over marine conservation projects shows that while there may be benefits such as NGOs' access to more funding than cashstrapped governments (Levine 2007) , there are also significant drawbacks. A few of these include the relatively short time frame in which NGOs implement and then abandon projects (Levine 2007; Keppel et al. 2012) , the tendency of NGO's to prioritise international conservation objectives over the development needs and conservation goals of local communities (Haley and Clayton 2003; Gray 2010; Benson 2012) , the propensity of NGOs to have neoliberal agendas favouring capital gains for themselves, tour operators, and/or other private transnational interests (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; De Santo 2012; Hill 2017) as well as favouring the peripheralisation of the government, which leads to less cooperation from critical governmental institutions such as the police and court system (Levine 2007) . This last point resonates with the findings of this study. Ultimately, addressing egregious infractions of marine resource use rules in 'community-managed' projects relies on the broader politico-legal structure (police and court system) of the government. Although the Komajivabe case study illustrates that the NGO worked in multiple ways to eliminate the need to rely on these institutions (e.g., developing local dispute resolution mechanisms and discursively emphasising the importance of local authority), once an egregious infraction is made and state authorities get involved, understandings of local authority over the MPA may shift. Future research focused specifically on this process would be extremely valuable.
Ultimately, this work study to the importance of understanding how different conservation actors construct and maintain authority over marine resources. Those materially and discursively aligning with greater community authority over resource use decision making are likely to weather political instability.
